. Courts will turn to that structure and the underlying state law in resolving disputes. Reg. HHS, which presumably could have compiled the relevant statistics, has never made this argument—not in its voluminous briefing or at oral argument in this Court nor, to our knowledge, in any of the numerous cases in which the issue now before us has been litigated around the country. Ante, at 39; see, e.g., Brief for HHS in No. The legislative history is correspondingly emphatic on RFRA’s aim. Ante, at 41–43. would deny [their employees] access to contraceptive coverage that the ACA would otherwise secure”). HHS and the dissent note that providing the coverage would not itself result in the destruction of an embryo; that would occur only if an employee chose to take advantage of the coverage and to use one of the four methods at issue.33 Ibid. With that accommodation extended, the Court asserts, “women would still be entitled to all [Food and Drug Administration]-approved contraceptives without cost sharing.” Ante, at 4. An established body of law specifies the rights and obligations of the people (including shareholders, officers, and employees) who are associated with a corporation in one way or another. 21 Although the principal dissent seems to think that Justice Brennan’s statement in Amos provides a ground for holding that for-profit corporations may not assert free-exercise claims, that was not Justice Brennan’s view. Moreover, as discussed, the amendment went further, providing that the exercise of religion “shall be construed in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter and the Constitution.” §2000cc–3(g). (incorporating §2000cc–5), and neither HHS nor the principal dissent can explain why Congress did this if it wanted to tie RFRA coverage tightly to the specific holdings of our pre-Smith free-exercise cases. In the Court’s view, RFRA demands accommodation of a for-profit corporation’s religious beliefs no matter the impact that accommodation may have on third parties who do not share the corporation owners’ religious faith—in these cases, thousands of women employed by Hobby Lobby and Conestoga or dependents of persons those corporations employ. 2004); T. Higgins, Man as Man: The Science and Art of Ethics 353, 355 (1949) (“The general principles governing cooperation” in wrongdoing—., “physical activity (or its omission) by which a person assists in the evil act of another who is the principal agent”—“present troublesome difficulties in application”); 1 H. Davis, Moral and Pastoral Theology 341 (1935) (Cooperation occurs “when A helps B to accomplish an external act by an act that is not sinful, and without approving of what B does”). If there is a compelling interest in contraceptive coverage, the Court suggests, Congress would not have created these exclusions. It seems likely, however, that the cost of providing the forms of contraceptives at issue in these cases (if not all FDA-approved contraceptives) would be minor when compared with the overall cost of ACA. whitehouse . (3) HHS argues that the connection between what the objecting parties must do and the end that they find to be morally wrong is too attenuated because it is the employee who will choose the coverage and contraceptive method she uses. The scheme had a large gap, how-ever; it left out preventive services that “many women’s health advocates and medical professionals believe are critically important.” 155 Cong. To qualify for this accommodation, an employer must certify that it is such an organization. Perhaps the gravity of the interests at stake has led the Court to assume, for purposes of its RFRA analysis, that the compelling interest criterion is met in these cases. Presumably in recognition of the weakness of this argument, both HHS and the principal dissent fall back on the broader contention that the Nation lacks a tradition of exempting for-profit corporations from generally applicable laws. Under and , the Court “requir[ed] the government to justify any substantial burden on religiously motivated conduct by a compelling state interest and by means narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.” v. , See supra, at 6. See also Gilardi v. United States Dept. The Act was crafted to “restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, is to determine” whether the plaintiffs’ asserted religious belief reflects “an honest conviction,” id., at 716, and there is no dispute here that it does. It lays out the story. The coverage helps safeguard the health of women for whom pregnancy may be hazardous, even life threatening. . Would the exemption the Court holds RFRA demands for employers with religiously grounded objections to the use of certain contraceptives extend to employers with religiously grounded objections to blood transfusions (Jehovah’s Witnesses); antidepressants (Scientologists); medications derived from pigs, including anesthesia, intravenous fluids, and pills coated with gelatin (certain Muslims, Jews, and Hindus); and vaccinations (Christian Scientists, among others)?31 According to counsel for Hobby Lobby, “each one of these cases . . 36 Online at http://cbo.gov/publication/45231. . See , at 25–28. Enterprising students use this website to learn AP class material, study for class quizzes and tests, and to brush up on course material before the big exam day. Reg. 31 Indeed, one of HHS’s stated reasons for establishing the religious accommodation was to “encourag[e] eligible organizations to continue to offer health coverage.” 78 Fed. 13–354, at 153. 2013) (describing Google.org, which “advance[s] its charitable goals” while operating as a for-profit corporation to be able to “invest in for-profit endeavors, lobby for policies that support its philanthropic goals, and tap Google’s innovative technology and workforce” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)); cf. of Indiana Employment Security Div., Yet his mother, a tent-revivalist preacher who had brought his father to Christ, believed that her younger son had something special. Found insideMoss and Baden tell the story of the Greens’ efforts to place a Bible curriculum in public schools; their rapid acquisition of an unparalleled collection of biblical antiquities; their creation of a closely controlled group of scholars to ... Green has been called the âmodest billionaire,â but one shouldnât be fooled by his mild manner and powder-gray suits. Issue: Whether the right to free exercise of religion, as envisioned by RFRA and RLUIPA, extends to for-profit businesses as well as non-profit organizations. It is HHS’s apparent belief that no insurance-coverage mandate would violate RFRA—no matter how significantly it impinges on the religious liberties of employers—that would lead to intolerable consequences. For example, extending Even if RFRA simply restored the status quo ante, there is no reason to believe, as HHS and the dissent seem to suggest, that the law was meant to be limited to situations that fall squarely within the holdings of pre- cases. 366 U. S. 599 (1961) Nor do we hold, as the dissent implies, that such corporations have free rein to take steps that impose “disadvantages . 39874 (2013). Today, Steven spends three-quarters of his time working on the museum: open for almost three years, it still needs lots of work âto get the word outââand, one might add, to deal with such embarrassments as the recent definitive disclosure that all the Dead Sea Scroll fragments in the museumâs collection were the work of highly sophisticated forgers. Trusted Baptist news source since 1888. See ante, at 46–47. , is instructive. The Court has entertained RFRA and free-exercise claims brought by nonprofit corporations. (2013) (as introduced) (Abortion Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, which would amend the definition of “health care entity” in §238n to include “hospital[s],” “health insurance plan[s],” and other health care facilities). Congress did not specify what types of preventive care must be covered; it authorized the Health Resources and Services Administration, a component of HHS, to decide. This argument is not easy to square with the position taken by HHS in providing exemptions from the contraceptive mandate for religious employers, such as churches, that have the very same religious objections as the Hahns and Greens and their companies. Dissent (Breyer), Opinion Announcement - June 30, 2014 (Part 1), Opinion Announcement - June 30, 2014 (Part 2). No known understanding of the term “person” includes some but not all corporations. 45 CFR §147.130(a)(1)(iv) (2013) (HHS); 29 CFR §2590.715–2713(a)(1)(iv) (2013) (Labor); 26 CFR §54.9815–2713(a)(1)(iv) (2013) (Treasury). Reg. As we noted above, RFRA applies to “a person’s” exercise of religion, 42 U. S. C. §§2000bb–1(a), (b), and RFRA itself does not define the term “person.” We therefore look to the Dictionary Act, which we must consult “[i]n determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise.” 1 U. S. C. §1. As a result, church-state conflicts will follow. This volume anticipates where and how these manifold disputes will arise. Second, how might these conflicts be resolved? The Dictionary Act makes that clear”). Though these two businesses have expanded over the years, they remain closely held, and David, Barbara, and their children retain exclusive control of both companies. Perhaps so, but as Hobby Lobby’s case demonstrates, such claims are indeed pursued by large corporations, employing thousands of persons of different faiths, whose ownership is not diffuse. No tradition, and no prior decision under RFRA, allows a religion-based exemption when the accommodation would be harmful to others—here, the very persons the contraceptive coverage requirement was designed to protect. 546 U. S. 418 new rights for any religious practice or for any potential litigant.” 139 Cong. Even if Smith did not control, the Free Exercise Clause would not require the exemption Hobby Lobby and Conestoga seek. Begin slowly - underline the details and sketch out the business case study description map. [21] But those beliefs, however deeply held, do not suffice to sustain a RFRA claim. See 45 CFR §147.131(b); 78 Fed. See ante, at 40.23 It bears note in this regard that the cost of an IUD is nearly equivalent to a month’s full-time pay for workers earning the minimum wage, Brief for Guttmacher Institute et al. 1, 2012) (debate and vote). Post, at 30. 19 Cf. Pp. Hobby Lobby: Good News, Bad News, and a Warning. “At a minimum,” according to the Court, such an approach would not “impinge on [Hobby Lobby’s and Conestoga’s] religious belief.” Ante, at 44. They also raised a claim under the Administrative Procedure Act, Other coverage requirements, such as immunizations, may be supported by different interests (for example, the need to combat the spread of infectious diseases) and may involve different arguments about the least restrictive means of providing them.” Ante, at 46. 29 U. S. C. §2611(4)(A)(i) (applicable to employers with 50 or more employees); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, §2000bb–2(1). As the second son of an itinerant Pentecostal pastor, he moved with his family throughout the Deep South during the 1940s, an era of both natural disasters and social and political upheaval. . as Amici Curiae 14–15. They do not pray, worship, observe sacraments or take other religiously-motivated actions separate and apart from the intention and direction of their individual actors.” 724 F. 3d, at 385 (emphasis added). would apply just as well if the employer said ‘no contraceptives’ ” (internal quotation marks added)). The exemptions the Court cites cover certain medical personnel who object to performing or assisting with abortions. Court ruling is a blow to Obamacare provision. We hold that the regulations that impose this obligation violate RFRA, which prohibits the Federal Government from taking any action that substantially burdens the exercise of religion unless that action constitutes the least restrictive means of serving a compelling government interest. First Amendment. RFRA, properly understood, distinguishes between “factual allegations that [plaintiffs’] beliefs are sincere and of a religious nature,” which a court must accept as true, and the “legal conclusion . in No. We hold that the regulations that impose this obligation violate RFRA, which prohibits the Federal Government from taking any action that substantially burdens the exercise of religion unless that action constitutes the least restrictive means of serving a compelling government interest. of Central School Dist. See id., at 642 (Brennan, J., joined by Stewart, J., dissenting); McGowan v. Maryland, David serves as the CEO of Hobby Lobby, and his three children serve as the president, vice president, and vice CEO. Given the Act’s moderate purpose, it is hardly surprising that RFRA’s enactment in 1993 provoked little controversy. Introduction. §2000cc(a)(1). If they and their companies refuse to provide contraceptive coverage, they face severe economic consequences: about $475 million per year for Hobby Lobby, $33 million per year for Conestoga, and $15 million per year for Mardel. The Congress that passed RFRA correctly read this Court’s pre-Smith case law as including within the “compelling interest test” a “least restrictive means” requirement. Citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U. S. 599 (1961), the Court questions why, if “a sole proprietorship that seeks to make a profit may assert a free-exercise claim, [Hobby Lobby and Conestoga] can’t . See supra, at 8–9. Thus, employers with sincere religious beliefs have no right to a religion-based exemption that would deprive employees of Social Security benefits without the employee’s consent—an exemption analogous to the one Hobby Lobby and Conestoga seek here. 42 U. S. C. §2000bb–1(a) (emphasis added). While the Government predicts that this number will decline over time, the total number of Americans working for employers to whom the contraceptive mandate does not apply is still substantial, and there is no legal requirement that grandfathered plans ever be phased out. in No. I have already discussed the “special solicitude” generally accorded nonprofit religion-based organizations that exist to serve a community of believers, solicitude never before accorded to commercial enterprises comprising employees of diverse faiths. , as “suggest[ing] . As this description of our reasoning shows, our holding is very specific. is the least restrictive means of furthering [a] compelling governmental interest” (emphasis added)). . The report noted the disproportionate burden women carried for comprehensive health services and the adverse health consequences of excluding contraception from preventive care available to employees without cost sharing. Some lower court judges have suggested that RFRA does not protect for-profit corporations because the purpose of such corporations is simply to make money.23 This argument flies in the face of modern corporate law. (1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened.” §2000bb(b)(1). Pp. That distinction is a facet of the pre-Smith jurisprudence RFRA incorporates. . The Guidelines provide that nonexempt employers are generally required to provide “coverage, without cost sharing” for “[a]ll Food and Drug Ad- ministration [(FDA)] approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling.” 77 Fed. 26178 (1993) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (RFRA was “designed to restore the compelling interest test for deciding free exercise claims.”). Recognizing a religious accommodation under RFRA for particular coverage requirements, therefore, does not threaten the viability of ACA’s comprehensive scheme in the way that recognizing religious objections to particular expenditures from general tax revenues would.43. IUDs, which are among the most reliable forms of contraception, generally cost women more than $1,000 when the expenses of the office visit and insertion procedure are taken into account. It is therefore “against [their] moral conviction to be involved in the termination of human life” after conception, which they believe is a “sin against God to which they are held accountable.” Ibid. The Court therefore held that, under the . But “[n]o individual decision by an employee and her physician—be it to use contraception, treat an infection, or have a hip replaced—is in any meaningful sense [her employer’s] decision or action.” Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F. 3d 850, 865 (CA7 2013) (Rovner, J., dissenting). See also Hernandez v. 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